How a Tariff Dispute Almost Caused the American Civil War
The Civil War is a central part of American history. The great bloodshed that began in the spring of 1861 settled many divisions in early America, from the prominence of slavery to questions about federalism to regional power. However, there were two earlier instances in which the U.S. could have descended into civil war; each was narrowly avoided through a mix of political skill, leadership, and sheer luck; this article will cover the first near miss.
In late 1832, President Andrew Jackson was preparing for his second term. However, South Carolina would almost bring America to war because Jackson…supported a tariff that addressed the state’s problems with the previous tariff. The innocuous policy difference would culminate in Jackson preparing to attack South Carolina just before his second inauguration. This dispute planted the seeds for South Carolina to leave the Union following Abraham Lincoln’s election in 1860. Welcome to the Nullification Crisis of 1832.
Nullification was the idea that states could ignore federal law if they thought it was unconstitutional. The idea emerged following the passage of the Sedition Act in the summer of 1798; the law targeted anti-Federalist newspapers for “lying” about the government. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison wrote resolutions against the Sedition Act for Virginia and Kentucky. The resolutions argued that the Constitution was a compact between the states that gave the Federal government certain powers; therefore, nullification was a check against federal power. However, the resolutions also said nullification didn’t allow the states to leave the Union since it was perpetual. Thankfully, Congress repealed the Sedition Act following Jefferson’s victory in the Election of 1800 (Farber, 1977, 324-328). The idea of nullification faded for a generation, but it returned in response to, of all things, economic issues.
South Carolina was an agrarian economy in the early 19th century. Their biggest sector was the cotton industry—which ran on slave labor. The lack of economic diversification made high tariffs devastating to the Southern states. In 1828, Congress passed a new tariff that protected Northern industries at the expense of the South. This “Abominable Tariff” drew South Carolina’s political leaders like John C Calhoun back to the old idea of nullification. That November, Andrew Jackson became president and Calhoun became his Vice President (Ellis, 1989, 4-13). The two men might have agreed on many things, but the crisis brought to light their differences.
On the surface, Jackson and Calhoun look like a natural pairing: both were Southern plantation owners who believed in state’s rights and free trade. However, the two had many political differences. Jackson believed—stemming from his military service—that preserving the Union was paramount since it protected the states from foreign threats. Jackson was also against high tariffs but he felt they were justified for certain industries linked to national security, and even if some states had a problem with the tariffs, the solution was getting Congress to lower them. By contrast, Calhoun was a state’s rights firebrand who put tariffs high on his priorities list.. Calhoun constantly asked Jackson to take on tariffs, but Jackson refused, given his shaky support in Congress. Calhoun didn’t help his case by constantly feuding with members of Jackson’s cabinet. Jackson lowered the tariffs on certain goods throughout his first term, but it did not satisfy his Southern supporters or the Nullifiers. Calhoun responded by aligning with the Nullifiers to get his tariff reform (Ellis, 41-65). For Calhoun, he would get what he wanted…at the possible expense of the Union.
The federal government announced in early 1832 that it had a surplus. The extra money allowed Congress to negotiate a new lower tariff. Meanwhile, Calhoun tried to run for president, assuming the public was alienated by Jackson’s divisive policies. However, his previous statements on nullification—and Jackson’s control over the Democrats—dashed his chances. Jackson—sick of Calhoun’s interference—made Martin van Buren his vice president during the party’s convention that May. That summer, Jackson signed the new tariff into law, angering the nullifiers. That October, nullifiers won control of South Carolina’s legislature. They announced the 1828 and 1832 tariffs were unconstitutional; their reasoning was dubious. They claimed Congress couldn’t use taxes to promote American industry…even though, as some pointed out, the states gave Congress few limits on regulating the economy. The Nullifiers also stated their decree wouldn’t go into effect until February 1st, 1833; the deadline gave them time to prepare South Carolina for federal intervention. That November, Jackson won reelection over Kentucky Senator Henry Clay. Jackson used the five months between his reelection and second inaugural to isolate South Carolina: he asked Clay to draft a new tariff that met the nullifiers’ demands, he let Georgia ignore the Supreme Court's ruling against them in Worcester V Georgia, and he asked the military to prepare for war with South Carolina. Jackson publicly responded to the nullifiers that December, stating nullification was illegal. The address angered many Southern Democrats who feared Jackson was escalating tensions. That same month, Calhoun resigned to be South Carolina’s new senator. In January 1833, several southern states declared their rejection of nullification; this message convinced the nullifiers to wait for the federal response. Meanwhile, Jackson asked Congress to draft legislation that would let the president use the military to collect taxes. Calhoun denounced Jackson’s “Force Bill” and stalled its progress in Congress. Clay then announced his new tariff. It would reduce the tariffs on all goods to a 20% rate over a decade. Jackson and many Democrats weren’t happy with it, but Clay promised them in exchange, he and his allies wouldn’t oppose the Force Bill in the Senate. Jackson accepted the deal hoping to avoid a possible civil war; even Calhoun—seeing the looming consequences of nullification—begrudgingly accepted it. Congress passed both bills in late February, and Jackson signed them that March; a few weeks later, the nullifiers rescinded their nullification order (Ellis, 65-101, 106-119, 158-177; Ratcliffe, 2000, 6-22). The crisis was over, the Union was saved, and South Carolina…would not forget this traumatic experience.
On the surface, the Nullification crisis looked like a victory for Jackson, but the winners were Calhoun and the nullifiers. They solidified their control over South Carolina after the crisis, giving Calhoun a strong political base for his future political ambitions. Jackson’s actions during the crisis confirmed the fears of anti-Jackson forces that Jackson would abuse his powers; these groups soon catalyzed into a new political party—the Whigs–under Clay’s leadership. The crisis’ biggest impact was on the slavery debate. Many Americans saw slavery as an institution unfortunately inherited from the Founders that would naturally die out. However, the crisis moved some, like Calhoun, to argue that free states had no right to interfere with slavery in slave states. Pro-slavery politicians following the crisis merged nullification, states’ rights, and slavery together into one coherent argument; South Carolina secessionists would use the nullifiers’ arguments to justify leaving the Union following the 1860 election. Finally, the crisis widened the riff between the industrializing north and the agrarian south. The North wanted a more active federal government, while the South was fine with a limited one. However, Southern states realized they needed a strong federal government to protect slavery, fueling anti-southern sentiments in the North (Ellis, 178-198). Ultimately, the Nullification crisis didn’t tear the Union apart…but it would make it much easier the next time such a crisis happened.
Works Cited
Ellis, R. E. (1989). The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights and the Nullification Crisis. Oxford University Press, Incorporated. https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/lib/asulib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=241318.
Farber, A. J. (1976). “Reflections on the Sedition Act of 1798”. American Bar Association Journal, 62(3), 324–328. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25727556.
Ratcliffe, D. J. (2000). “The Nullification Crisis, Southern Discontents, and the American Political Process”. American Nineteenth Century History, 1(2), 1-30. https://doi-org.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/10.1080/14664650008567014.
