Sweden and Finland’s Accession to NATO: Analyzed
In May 2022, Sweden and Finland applied for NATO membership. The decision arrived at a time of the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, which sparked, and is continuing to elicit, growing security concerns among its European neighbors. Both Sweden and Finland have engaged in regular military cooperation with NATO allies, especially with respect to the sale and purchase of military equipment. Finland’s decision to purchase 64 F-35 aircraft from the US aerospace corporation Lockheed Martin in early 2022 was viewed as a move that, although not entirely indicative of a NATO future, provided a parallel with the neighboring, fellow Arctic country Norway, which also operates the F-35 aircraft. Indeed, the sense of shared military prowess and interoperability between Arctic countries and the wider NATO intergovernmental organization as a whole is a fundamental component of both the feasibility and practicality of Sweden and Finland’s decision to join NATO. Grounded in strategic security and safety concerns, the decision has received widespread support in both countries and has been welcomed by US and European allies. However, it has not been an altogether seamless process, with approval yet to be granted by 2 of the 30 NATO member countries: Turkey and Hungary. Hungary is expected to approve Sweden and Finland’s application in its first parliamentary session of the year in February. However, the barrier to entry still remains through Turkey’s insistence on a new requisite for the Swedish approach to Kurdish groups and militia figures in Sweden. While NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg still expects the accession to advance in 2023, Turkey’s demands represent a significant obstacle, casting doubt on accepting the prospective memberships.
Why do Sweden and Finland seek to join NATO?
Sweden and Finland’s decision to apply for NATO membership can be rationalized with the analysis of several strategic considerations. For instance, NATO membership for the two countries would improve access to international arms markets and provide opportunities for further specialization and collaboration with allies (Forsberg, Kähkönen, Öberg, 2022). It is also worth noting that Sweden and Finland are two of NATO’s most trusted partners and allies and strong links between the organization and the two countries have existed for several decades. Evidential in the timing of the decision to apply for NATO membership is the presence of a highly pressing security concern, which is the war in Ukraine. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, public support for NATO membership rose rapidly almost overnight, with a strong majority of both Swedish and Finnish citizens supporting the membership application (Doherty 2022).
Finnish President Sauli Niinistö observed the lack of room for non-alignment with NATO in present circumstances, citing further division largely perpetuated by the actions of the Kremlin. Magdalena Andersson, who was the Swedish Prime Minister at the time of the decision to apply for membership, viewed the decision to apply to be one of absolute urgency and necessity. She observed, "Should Sweden be the only country in the Baltic Sea region that was not a member of NATO,” it would be in “a very vulnerable position,” increasing the possibility of Russia pressuring Sweden in a strategic attempt to distance it from its US and European allies (Doherty 2022).
The pattern of Sweden and Finland's increasing European alliance is evidenced in the long term by their decision to join the European Union in 1995. US relations are also a significant component worth considering, and Sweden and Finland are both conscious of the fact that their joining NATO would be beneficial for their relations with the US with respect to trade deals and defense-related purchases and investments. Moreover, their membership enhances overall NATO security policy by helping to enforce American commitment to protecting security and sovereignty in Europe (Carafano, 2022).
What could NATO gain from their membership?
The advantages NATO allies stand to gain from Sweden and Finland’s membership may be viewed in part in the two countries’ decisions to increase their defense budgets significantly. The Finnish government’s fiscal plan for 2023-2026 allocates an annual increase of $431-833 million for the Defence Force’s “operating costs” with a total expenditure of $2.4 billion set for the period (Forsberg, Kähkönen, Öberg, 2022). The Swedish defense industry is significantly larger and more wide-ranging in its influence than Finland. The country is the world’s 13th largest arms exporter and has an esteemed reputation for manufacturing and developing cutting-edge military technology. In addition, its military expenditures are expected to increase by 40% to approximately $12 billion by 2025 (Forsberg, Kähkönen, Öberg, 2022). This reflects a longer trend in defense spending increases in Sweden, as the defense budget is expected to reach 2% of GDP in 2028. One can certainly imagine how this spending and military capability could add to the military power at NATO’s disposal.
There is also a significant geostrategic element to these benefits as integrating Swedish and Finnish naval and air capabilities into NATO would provide additional strength to the defense of the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions (Nilsen, 2022). Finland in particular provides strong geostrategic support in any prospective conflict with Russia as it borders Russia and its forces are well accustomed to operating in similar climates.
Another important advantage for NATO is that Sweden and Finland practice force integration and have a high level of interoperability, which includes sharing naval bases and the partial integration of both countries’ air forces. This interoperability in itself is valuable and would help NATO allies integrate Sweden and Finland’s forces into its collective force in a shorter time.
Sweden also seeks to join the European Sky Shield Initiative, a German-led plan to create a continental air and missile defense system (Milne, Foy, 2023). Thus, another advantage of Sweden’s membership in NATO is that it would help increase the strength of this initiative.
What are the obstacles to the acceptance of Sweden and Finland’s NATO application?
The obstacles Sweden and Finland face in their prospective accession to NATO are well documented. Turkey’s refusal to accept their application is indicative of several gripes Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan harbors over Sweden and Finland’s treatment of Kurdish groups and figures. Indeed, Erdoğan has previously described Finland and Sweden as a "hatchery" of terror groups (Euronews, 2023). The Turkish government’s attempt to suppress Kurdish identification and ethnic expression is not a sentiment that has reached widespread support in the West. While certain Kurdish groups such as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) have been labeled as terrorists by Turkey, the US, and the EU, due to their use of violence to achieve their goals; the broader Turkish treatment of more peaceful Kurdish groups has received widespread criticism from Western governments.
To further understand Turkey’s discontent with Sweden and Finland’s treatment of Kurdish forces, it is necessary to understand the direct military opposition Turkey has taken in response to PKK-linked Kurdish fighters in Syria. Western governmental actors, such as the US and the EU (including Sweden) have provided significant amounts of weapons and funding to Kurdish forces in Syria, which has provoked increased Turkish attacks on these same forces. Turkey has been hit with embargoes in response to these attacks. Yet, these measures have had little success as the differences in how Western governments and the Turkish government views Kurdish forces is somewhat intractable (Turak, 2022). The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), established with support from the US, have been incredibly successful in attacking ISIS in Syria. Still, the Western alignment with these forces led to tensions with Turkey and is ultimately continuing to drive an alliance between Turkey and opposing forces in Syria, such as those backed by Russia.
Beyond the Turkish dismay at Western military support of Kurdish forces, Sweden, in particular, has a history of taking in Kurdish refugees and asylum seekers, especially in political situations, with several Kurdish people holding seats in the Swedish Parliament (Turak, 2022). Paul Levin from the Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies in his analysis of the relations between Turkey and Sweden, says Turkey's “primary concern” is “the presence of PKK activists in Sweden” (Euronews, 2023).
The Swedish government also faces backlash from Turkey over its support of the PKK’s political wing, the PYD, which it does not designate as being terrorist through PKK affiliation. Furthermore, Turkey is also accusing Sweden of harboring Gulen movement members previously allied with Erdoğan, before being designated as a terrorist group in 2016 following a failed coup attempt and criticized by its own leader Fethullah Gulen.
Sweden has made numerous concessions to Turkey, lifting an embargo on weapons exports to the country and highlighting its commitment to fighting terrorism, yet the Turkish government remains unappeased (Milne, Foy, 2023).
Therefore, with Hungary expected to ratify support for Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership in February, the Turkish obstacle continues to be the determining factor in the success of the membership application.
What are the expectations going forward?
Turkey’s continued efforts to clamp down on suspects in the 2016 coup are reflected in its desire to extradite exiled Turkish journalist Bulent Kenes. This demand is of critical importance to Turkey and is among the issues preventing its approval of Sweden and Finland’s NATO application. While the majority of Swedish people are in favor of NATO integration, there is a prevailing sentiment that they do not want to see a political, or governmental decision undermining the legal system. Additionally, Turkey is also seeking to extradite 33 alleged Kurdish fighters and coup plot suspects from Sweden and Finland (Al Jazeera, 2023).
Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson maintains that Turkey is asking for too much in the negotiations and said in early January that “the decision is now with Turkey,” adding Sweden has given as many concessions as it is willing to give but Turkey says it wants things that Sweden cannot and will not give (Michaelson, 2023). NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg says he expects Sweden and Finland to join NATO as early as 2023, but refuses to commit to any exact dates. He has reiterated that Sweden and Finland are committed to cooperation with Turkey in the long term and is optimistic about their eventual accession to NATO.
*Edited by Samuel Jaffe
Works Cited
Forsberg, F., Kähkönen, A., & Öberg, J. (2022, June 29) Implications of a Finnish and Swedish NATO Membership for Security in the Baltic Sea Region. Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/implications-finnish-and-swedish-nato-membership-security-baltic-sea-region
Doherty, E. (2022, June 28) Why NATO formed and why Finland and Sweden want to join the alliance. Axios. https://www.axios.com/2022/05/16/nato-expansion-ukraine-russia-putin-finland-sweden
Carafano, J. (2022, July 6) Why Sweden and Finland Joining NATO Makes Perfect Sense. The Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/why-sweden-and-finland-joining-nato-makes-perfect-sense
Nilsen, T. (2022, May 28) Finland’s first F-35s will be based up north. The Barents Observer. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/05/finlands-first-f-35-will-be-based-north#:~:text=The%20first%20F%2D35s%20will,northernmost%20Europe%20will%20be%20significant
Milne, R., & Foy, H. (2023, January 8) Sweden warns it cannot meet Turkey’s demands for backing Nato bid. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/9df4147d-beae-4479-b0f4-a13f6acea251
Euronews with AFP. (2023, January 8) Turkey 'wants things we can't give', says NATO hopeful Sweden. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/2023/01/08/turkey-wants-things-we-cant-give-them-says-nato-hopeful-sweden
Turak, N. (2022, May 23) Conflict, politics and history: Why Turkey is standing in the way of Sweden and Finland’s NATO bids. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/23/why-turkey-doesnt-want-sweden-finland-to-join-nato.html
Al Jazeera. (2023, January 8) Sweden says cannot fulfil Turkey’s demands for NATO application. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/8/sweden-cannot-fulfil-turkeys-demands-for-nato-application-pm
Michaelson, R. (2023, January 14) Turkey pushes back vote on Sweden and Finland’s Nato accession. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/14/turkey-pushes-back-vote-on-sweden-and-finlands-nato-accession
