President Erdoğan’s Fatal Mistakes
Turkey’s divisive President Erdoğan has had a difficult year. From a stinging loss in the 2019 municipal elections to having to confront the coronavirus to lengthy and costly military deployments, the president has been struggling to keep his base satisfied and has given a chance for his opponents to unify against him. Furthermore, Turkey’s problems have been compounded by poor policy decisions that will impact his prospects for re-election in 2023.
Election Interference
Regarding elections, Mr. Erdoğan put his thumb on the scale to overturn his party’s loss in Istanbul, the country’s economic hub and the city that propelled him to international fame. Back in May 2019, Turkey’s Supreme Election Council nullified the Istanbul elections, citing irregularities and mischief by ballot handlers. The decision drew international ire as it was clearly politically-motivated and disingenuous. The autocratic decision, however, proved ineffective and quite embarrassing for President Erdoğan and his party: the election redo was lost again to Ekrem İmamoğlu of the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The sharp blow reveals two truths: Turkish voters were able to decipher the political machinations behind the AKP’s interference, and that the president and his party are: “weaker now than at any time since they came to power almost seventeen years ago” (Cook). The results of these elections should frighten the president, who has now seen loud and clear that an increasing portion of the population is growing apathetic about his rule and trajectory.
Coronavirus Response
On another front, President Erdoğan has failed Turkey in its response to the coronavirus pandemic. The country has had a rout with the disease, with over 4,000 deaths as of May 14 (Toksabay). While the country may have been able to close borders and provide testing, President Erdoğan has sought to balance the need for lockdowns and curfews with his prerogative to retain high popularity. This reality is unsurprising given his past year in office, which has been plagued by high amounts of national debt and currency deflation. The government was also slow in detecting coronavirus cases in major cities, as the first case was not recorded until March 11; whereas cases had been discovered in neighboring Armenia much earlier, even with the latter’s fewer resources and means to do so. Furthermore, President Erdoğan’s response to the virus has become erratic. Back in April, the government announced a weekend curfew which resulted in thousands of families bursting into stores to purchase much-needed supplies in anticipation of this policy (Politico). When criticized for his approach to the pandemic, the president had the following to say: “Our country will hopefully get rid of not only the coronavirus, but also these media and politics viruses as well.” This statement is all the more worrisome given that Turkey has the highest number of jailed reporters in the world. The virus has been highly politicized in the country, and thousands are continuing to perish as a result.
One key example of Erdoğan’s politicization of the movement occurred in Istanbul. The president is cognizant of the challenge that Ekrem İmamoğlu poses to his reign; therefore, the national government announced the weekend curfew without notifying Istanbul’s municipal government. This sly tactic left the city’s authorities ill-prepared for the onslaught of panicked shoppers and contributed to the viral videos of skirmishes in and around the shops. The run on the shops erased all social distancing efforts that had been urged in weeks leading up to the policy, further endangering the city’s inhabitants. Additionally, the federal government has been attempting to limit the municipalities’ responses to the pandemic. Mayors of Istanbul and Ankara indicated that the interior ministry had launched criminal investigations into coronavirus funding initiatives in their cities. The strategy is clear: Erdoğan is attempting to demonstrate to the Turkish population that only he and his party can save them from the abyss. This strategy will likely backfire: if Erdoğan fails to engender progress in curbing the number of deaths and cases, the Turks will be quick to blame him and may vote him out come 2023. Economically, the virus has taken a toll on tourism and manufacturing in the country, further harming Turkey’s prospects.
Foreign Policy Quagmires
With regard to foreign policy, Erdoğan is attempting a well-known deflection strategy in Syria. The president, by deploying troops to the north of its Arab neighbor, is distracting citizens from the domestic troubles by blaming Assad for Turkey’s economic woes. Erdoğan has also not been shy to criticize the influx of refugees from Syria and has politicized the refugee issue in the past, recently opening the Turkish-Greek border to put pressure on a regional enemy and EU member. Turkey and Greece have been at diplomatic, and at times, military odds over Cyprus since 1974 and continue to compete for islands and resources in the Mediterranean. Opening the borders to Greece forces the EU member to accommodate the refugees and expend government revenue, a strategic benefit for Erdoğan. The decision has only aggravated the country’s standing with the EU, as it represented a breach in understandings concerning Turkey sheltering the refugees in exchange for EU funds. Turkey’s incursion into the north of Syria has also drawn international criticism and is seen as aggravating the military reality on the ground. Erdoğan has also pushed to expand Turkey’s footprint in North Africa, as he has deployed troops to Libya to support the UN-recognized government. This military and political backing have not yielded a solution to the problem, and indeed may merely prolong the conflict for years to come (International Crisis Group). Turkey’s gamble, while approved by the Turkish Parliament, has continued to drain Turkish resources and revenue, at a time when the government is running large levels of debt and whose currency is suffering from deflation (Tastekin). As such, President Erdoğan realizes he will need to act quickly to secure Turkish access to gas resources off the coast of Libya, which explains why he has already signed two security and maritime memoranda of understanding with Tripoli. Doing so might offset the economic burden of financing this intervention, but it will be a challenge for Turkey to monetize and market the newly-acquired resources.
President Erdoğan has a tough road ahead of him to rectify the poor policy decisions he has made. The coronavirus could not have come at a worse time for his presidency given the country’s economic woes. Furthermore, Turkey is looking to increase its regional role and influence without having the macroeconomic foundations to support these initiatives. Driving up deficits and seeing the lira’s strength slipping, Erdoğan will have a difficult time regaining the country’s confidence. The 2019 municipal elections already indicate a rise in anti-Erdoğan sentiment, most notably in Istanbul and Ankara. If Erdoğan is to secure another term in office, he must reconsider his penchant for election interference and foreign interventions. Finally, the president should also look to present a consistent front to his country and to the world; indeed, he has demonstrated varying profiles when addressing Turkish or international crowds (Kesgin). Not only have his policies and leadership style damaged his domestic popularity, but the international community is taking notice, which may harm critical Turkish alliances and foreign investments in the country.
Sources:
Barkey. Henri J. (2019, May 10). Erdogan Just Committed Political Suicide. Foreign Policy. Accessed May 15 on https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/10/erdogan-just-committed-political-suicide-istanbul/
Cook, Steven A. (2019, June 24). Istanbul’s Election: What Does Erdogan’s Loss Mean for Turkey? Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed May 15 on https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/istanbuls-election-what-does-erdogans-loss-mean-turkey
International Crisis Group. (2020, April 30). Turkey Wades Into Libya’s Troubled Waters. Accessed May 15 on https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/257-turkey-wades-libyas-troubled-waters
Kesgin, Baris. (2018, June 18). Turkey’s Erdogan: leadership and foreign policy audiences. Accessed May 16 on https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683849.2019.1575735?af=R&journalCode=ftur20
Politico. (April 22, 2020). How politics derailed Turkey’s pandemic response. Accessed May 15 on https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-turkey-pandemic-response/
Tastekin, Fehim. (2020, April 5). Turkey pursues Libya campaign despite growing financial woes. Accessed May 15 on https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/turkey-libya-campaign-keep-on-despite-coronavirus-outbreak.html
Toksabay, Ece. (2020, May 14). Turkey’s coronavirus death toll reaches 4,000: health minister. Reuters. Accessed May 15 on https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-turkey-toll/turkeys-coronavirus-death-toll-reaches-4000-health-minister-idUSKBN22Q2VI
